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Abstract 
 
 
We show, by a simple difference-in-difference methodology that, contrary to 
prior research, robustly raising the deductibility limit associated to pension 
fund holdings in Italy did not succeed in  boosting households’ contributions to 
this form of savings. Some other empirical finding also suggest that this policy 
measure may have not even increased the average amount of first time 
contributors to such funds. In view of the specific features of the Italian market 
for complementary insurance (relatively young and less developed), these 
empirical results might be of interest to policymakers acting in countries with 
similar features (for instance, some of the more recent EU members). 
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1. Introduction 
 
During the last thirty years, the issue of retirement savings has become more and 
more important in the agenda of governments across industrialized countries, as 
public pension systems have progressively fallen short of providing adequate 
retirement insurance, also in view of increased longevity  
The objective of stimulating private retirement savings has been pursued by 
governments by means of two set of measures. First, there have been registered 
efforts devoted to create an institutional environment favourable to private retirement 
savings, such as the introduction of more conservative asset management rules for 
private funded pension schemes.  
Second, economic incentives aimed at increasing the convenience of retirement 
savings with respect to ordinary savings have been introduced. As underlined by Yoo 
and de Serres (2004), for a large number of OECD countries these policies are very 
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relevant for public finances. According to their estimates, the present net value of 
revenues lost by governments as a consequence of fiscal incentive to private 
retirement savings can reach up to the 40 per cent of total contributions to these tax-
favoured plans, and most OECD countries incur into a cost corresponding to more 
than 10 per cent of the overall sums saved by individuals.  
In year 2000, the budgetary costs of these measures, computed with an accrued 
criterion, has been larger than 1 per cent of GDP for a high number of OECD 
countries. The main economic arguments which justify the loss of revenues implied 
by these policies, as summarized by Hubbard and Skinner (1996), originate from the 
existence of market and individual failures: without an appropriate intervention, the 
stock of capital is generally lower than its optimal social value; moreover, the 
constitution of an adequate pension can reduce future government's expenditure for 
impoverished elderly; lastly, families tend to be “impatient”, i.e. to over-consume in 
the present with respect to what would be done by a really rational agent. On the 
other hand, this kind of behaviour could also be imputed to some form of hyperbolic 
discounting, as was made clear by Laibson (1997). 
The economic literature in the field has therefore reached a wide consensus as 
regards the need of increasing family private savings of real world economies, but 
there is no consensus on the fact that fiscal incentives are really effective in pursing 
the objective of bringing a remedy to all the aforementioned market imperfections.  
Indeed, if one considers the issue from a theoretical point of view, within the 
traditional life-cycle theory a fiscal incentive can be assimilated to an increase in the 
return of savings, originating two opposite effects: a substitution effects which 
increases saving, and an income effect which reduces it. In general, the final effect 
cannot be established a priori without specifying consumer preferences. Moreover, 
the empirical analysis developed within this framework has not reached a clear 
answer over the sign of the relationship between the interest rate and savings.  
The failure of the traditional theory in explaining real-world saving behaviour has led 
many economists to consider the issue within the framework of behavioural 
economics (Thaler 1994, Busana Banterle 2002), where the hypothesis of full 
rationality is removed. Under this perspective, fiscal incentives to retirement saving 
plans are fully justified on the grounds that individuals respond positively to public 
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policies aimed at reducing their myopia and to enhance their self-control for a 
rational temporal distribution of their lifetime resources.  
Aside from these recent theoretical developments, the debate over the effectiveness 
of fiscal incentives to retirement savings has remained mainly an empirical one and 
the focus of applied research has been that of assessing the effectiveness of specific 
incentives introduced across industrialized countries. The issue of their effectiveness 
can be considered under different perspectives; first of all, it is relevant to establish if 
these incentives are effective in stimulating the participation and the accumulation of 
wealth into tax favoured private funded pension scheme. In fact, to the extent that 
wealth is redressed toward more illiquid assets, improving on the intertemporal 
distribution of lifetime individual resources, these policies can be regarded as 
successful from a microeconomic point of view.  
This is, however, not enough to prove that these policies are effective in obtaining 
the more ambitious macroeconomic objectives of increasing overall family private 
savings and aggregate national savings. Indeed, the accumulation of wealth in tax 
favoured plans may have been entirely financed by a reduction in the stock of other 
financial and real assets.  
Lastly, some authors have underlined that even if these measures turned out to be 
effective in stimulating family private savings, this would not necessarily imply an 
increase in national aggregate savings, for these policies are costly for the public 
budget and thus reduce public savings.  
The aim of this paper is an explorative analysis, by using Italian micro-data, of the 
impact of a fiscal measure designed to spur households’ investment in supplemental 
pension insurance, i.e. retirement funds owned by individuals in addition to those for 
which participation is made compulsory by law (public or private). 
Italian complementary pension legislation has had a long and fairly complex history. 
The last few years, starting from the beginning of the 90’s, witnessed a 
comprehensive reform of social security, induced by the lack of macroeconomic 
sustainability of the old welfare system.  
A key element in this reformation process has been the tax treatment of 
pension funds. Under that respect new guidelines allowing for the deduction of 
premiums paid by workers from their gross income were introduced, replacing some 
older regulation dating back to 1993. As in the case of life insurance products, a 
deduction limit of about 1291 euros (or 2 percent of the overall yearly wage) was 
introduced for pension funds, but it was made clear that this limit might be increased 
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for policy purposes. An important increase of that limit, up to about 5000 euros (or 
12% or income), has been introduced by a new decree, n. 47, in 2000, coming into 
effect as of January 1
st
, 2001.  
We believe that this large modification in the tax treatment of private pension 
contributions, which has brought the deductibility options more in line with those of 
other large European markets (approximately as in Denmark, Germany and United 
Kingdom, for instance) constitutes a sort of natural experiment, whose effect we 
intend to evaluate in the next few paragraphs. The new fiscal treatment of premiums 
made pension funds relatively more convenient with respect to competing saving 
instruments, and did so to quite a large extent. This is why we would like to 
understand whether the intended goal of this measure was achieved, in the sense of 
succeeding in boosting private retirement savings. Our findings seem to indicate that 
this was not the case; for some reasons, yet to be investigated, investors did not seem 
to be particularly reactive to that policy measure. Our effort will constitute one of the 
few attempts to explore the working of the Italian market for complementary pension 
funds, and might be of some relevance under various respects. First and foremost, 
they will shed some light onto the mechanisms at work in a relatively young and less 
developed market for complementary pension products, compared to the more 
mature markets in otherwise similar countries in the European Union. Second, the 
policy change is quite robust and unprecedented in Italy, which should turn it into a 
sort of natural experiment. Third, unlike in some previous empirical research, data 
from the Bank of Italy Survey on Households’ Income and Wealth will allow us to 
track the behaviour of current or prospective investors over a time horizon which is 
not too short (two years) to allow the effects to become apparent.  
The remainder of this work is organized as follows: section 2 contains a 
review of empirical contributions to this research field. Section 3 will present data 
used for the analysis, with some descriptive statistics. Section 4 illustrates the results 
of a difference in difference methodology applied to complementary retirement 
savings. Section 5 wraps up, with some final comments. 
 
2. Fiscal policy measures and retirement savings: some empirical results. 
 
Even though many experiences of fiscal policies favouring retirement savings 
worldwide have actually been carried out, the empirical analysis presents some 
difficulties that could be mainly attributed to the inappropriateness of the available 
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statistical evidence, which also motivates the lack of consensus among applied 
economists and econometricians.  
The main problem, that is common to almost all policy evaluation studies, originates 
from the fact that, by definition, family savings (in a given country) induced by a 
fiscal incentive is obtained as a difference between family savings when the fiscal 
incentive is introduced, minus the amount of savings that  would have resulted (in the 
same country) in the absence of fiscal incentives, at the same date. Now, this 
difference involves two quantities, of which only one can be observed, the other 
being only identifiable by imposing some structure to the data, a procedure that is 
generally implemented on the basis of non-testable a priori beliefs. Thus, the main 
issue of the empirical analysis has been that of introducing reasonable hypotheses 
allowing for the correct identification of the aforementioned difference.  
The main difficulty lies in the fact that, when estimating the effect of the policy, one 
has to define a control group that differs from the treatment group only by the fact 
that it has not received the treatment (the fiscal incentive). In fact, what is generally 
available is the outcome of individuals who chose to participate in private retirement 
saving programs and that of individuals who have chosen not to participate. Many 
authors have stressed that these two groups are characterized by different tastes for 
saving, possibly implying an overestimate of the effect associated to the policy.  
With regard to USA, the empirical analysis has focussed over the effectiveness of 
401(k) and Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs), that are saving plans where 
contributions and investment earnings are subject to tax exemptions, while 
withdrawals are subject to taxation. Poterba, Venti and Wise (1996) use three 
different empirical strategies to assess the effectiveness of these plans: a within-
group comparison of savings made by the same set of families at different dates; a 
between-group comparison of savings of different groups of family at the same date; 
a between-group comparison of savings made by different cohorts of families. Their 
analysis concludes that a large part of contributions to these two tax-favoured plans 
represents additional savings and not only a substitution for other financial and real 
assets owned by families.  
At the opposite, Engen, Gale and Scholtz (1996) underline that there are many 
confounding factors that determine an overstatement of the impact of these plans 
(IRAs, 401(k) and Keogh plans); on the basis of their estimates, these tax-favoured 
saving programs had no significant impact on private savings, although they find a 
strong effect of such plans upon the allocation of saving and wealth.  
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Attanasio and DeLeire (2002) find that families who begin to participate in IRAs do 
not exhibit, in the short term, a consumption pattern which is unambiguously 
different from that of families that already participated in the market (it is, however, 
under some specification of the model used). Therefore, they conclude that IRAs do 
not generate additional private saving, resulting in a mere reshuffling of existing 
assets.  
Attanasio, Banks and Wakefield (2004) have recently examined the same empirical 
issue for USA IRAs as well as for the tax-favoured retirement saving plans TESSAs 
(Tax Exempt Special Savings Accounts) and ISAs (Individual Savings Accounts), 
introduced in the United Kingdom. These last two schemes differ from IRAs in the 
fact that they guarantee fiscal exemptions on accrued income and capital gains as 
well as on withdrawals, but not on contributions coming from net income.  
As regards IRAs, the authors find that consumption dynamics of new contributors do 
not significantly differ from that of continuing contributors and conclude that the 
plan is quite ineffective in generating new private savings. As regards UK, the 
authors reach the same conclusion: the introduction of TESSAs and ISAs has not 
brought about a clear increase of net private savings, but rather a reshuffling of 
existing financial and real assets. All in all, they conclude that “only relatively small 
fractions of the funds going into tax-advantaged savings vehicles can be considered to 
be „new‟ saving” and that those plans are in any case very costly to the public budget. 
However, we must stress that the empirical results are based on a very short term kind 
of behaviour, and the authors themselves recognize that their evidence “is limited in its 
scope by the nature of the data and policy variation available to researchers”.  
Disney, Emmerson and Wakefield (2007) consider the effectiveness of the 
Stakeholder Pension, a retirement saving vehicle recently introduced in the UK, 
which guarantees tax reliefs proportional to contributions and where returns accruing 
to the plan are tax exempt, while withdrawals are subject to taxation. The authors, by 
applying a difference in differences methodology, conclude that this plan is effective 
in increasing aggregate private retirement savings, but they do not face the wider 
question of establishing if this plan affects aggregate private savings.  
Corneo, Keese and Schroder (2008) analyse the effectiveness of the Riester scheme, 
a recently introduced plan that favours private retirement saving in Germany through 
allowances and tax reliefs. Once again, the authors do not reach a clear-cut 
conclusion, but on the basis of their results it is not possible to exclude that these 
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plans are ineffective in increasing the probability to participate and in increasing the 
propensity to savings.  
A different conclusion has been reached by Paiella and Tiseno (2009), who have 
considered the effectiveness of the introduction of tax incentives to private retirement 
savings in Italy. The authors, employing a difference in differences approach, find 
that these policies have been effective in generating a substantial substitution of non 
tax-favoured non-retirement wealth for tax-favoured pension funds, but have been 
ineffective in increasing private family savings.  
To sum up, we might argue that the only widely accepted empirical evidence is that 
tax incentives may indeed be effective in favouring the participation and the amount 
of contributions to retirement saving plans. On the opposite, no consensus has been 
reached concerning the effect of tax incentives on private aggregate savings as well 
on the effects of these incentives on aggregate national savings in the long run. 
However, this last issue has been less analyzed in the empirical literature, due to the 
high level of uncertainty involved in the calculations of the long run effects on public 
savings associated to a tax expenditure, especially if one incorporates in the analysis 
the behavioural responses of the private sector, and due to limitations in data.  
When reviewing the empirical findings, it is also important to underline that the tax-
favoured plans examined in this literature have different structures which make them 
not totally comparable, so that conclusions drawn cannot be generalized. The scope 
of findings is also limited by the fact that many authors have shown that the 
underlying institutional context strongly conditions the outcome of these policies, 
implying that those policies that have proven to be successful in a given country may 
not be easily exportable to other countries. In what follows we will somehow (with 
all necessary caveats) challenge the consensus about the effectiveness of fiscal 
incentives in promoting retirement funds, by analyzing data from a specific policy 
measure which should have affected the choice of consumers on the Italian market.  
 
3. The Italian case: a preliminary look at data 
 
The data we use come from the Bank of Italy Survey on Household Income and 
Wealth (SHIW, in the sequel), an extremely comprehensive and detailed survey run 
every two years, containing information about households (around 8000 for each 
wave) and individuals’ (about 20000) income, wealth, savings, expenditures and 
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socio-demographic features
1
. For reasons made clear below, we just used the 2000 
and 2002 waves of the survey for the econometric analysis, but waves from 1995 to 
2006 for the descriptive analysis. 
It is worth noticing that our survey actually refers to “private/supplementary 
pensions, annuities and other forms of insurance-based saving”; as these forms of 
insurance all share the same fiscal treatment, we will keep on simply referring to 
them as complementary retirement funds, although they are a mixture of some 
different saving instruments. 
Only household level data will be used, as the survey does not always distinguish 
among the various contributors to private pension schemes making it difficult, if not 
impossible, to attribute the various payments to the proper family members, and 
because many variables of interest are only available at the household level.  
Moreover, in the sequel we will focus upon households possessing just one private 
retirement insurance, since in the case of multiple insurance we may not distinguish 
among the various contributions, which also makes it hard to assign the 
corresponding household to the treatment or the control group, as will be made 
clearer in the sequel. All economic variables have been expressed in real terms, by 
suitably deflating them with a chain-linked GDP deflator, based at the year 2000. 
Observations have also been weighted by the weights provided in the surveys. 
In table 1 we have summarized, in terms of sample means, some socio-demographic 
and economic features of all households taking part in the surveys, and of those 
households contributing to private pension plans, for the pre-treatment and the post-
treatment periods, namely the 1995, 1998 and 2000 waves for the former, and 2002, 
2004 and 2006 for the latter. Comparing those sets of descriptive variables will help 
us to qualitatively assess the differences between contributors and non contributors, 
in terms of socio-economic variables, and their dynamics. 
In particular, odd columns from (1) to (6) contain the values for some variables 
related to all households in the survey, for the pre-treatment waves (1995, 1998, 
2000), whereas even columns contain those values for households contributing to 
exactly one private pension. Columns (7) to (12) contain exactly the same 
information, but for the post-treatment period (2002, 2004 and 2006 waves of the 
survey), for the two groups. 
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Table 1 
 
A cursory look at columns 1-3-5 yields some interesting insights: first of all, we 
notice a good degree of homogeneity of households across the pre-treatment periods, 
in terms of demographics and socio-cultural variables. As for the more economic 
variables we may notice, over the period 1995-2000, an increase in net wealth and, to 
a lesser extent, in income. 
The picture of the representative household we get from columns 2-4-6, related to 
contributors to one pension fund is fairly different. In particular, we have younger 
and more educated heads of households, more often residing in the north. That 
education, grossly speaking, is a key issue in spreading the use of supplemental 
retirement funds has been made clear, for example, by Busana Banterle (2002). In 
terms of economic variables, contributors are far better off than the average in the 
whole sample. 
Columns (7) to (12) describe the same features for households in the post-treatment 
period (2002–2006), again for the whole sample and for the subsample of 
contributors to one pension fund. As for socio-demographics, we observe a certain 
degree of homogeneity with respect to the pre-reform period, except for a slight 
increase in (years of) education.  
The same differences we noticed between the whole sample and the sub-sample also 
hold in the post-reform period. 
In particular, the head of household is, on average, ten years younger than his 
counterpart in the whole sample, and possesses a higher level of education. 
Moreover, 65% of those households reside in northern Italy. 
Looking more closely at economic variables, we find again that the participants to 
private pension funds are on average richer individuals, with a larger overall net 
wealth. 
 
Table 2 here 
 
To get a more complete picture, we present in table 2 the percentages of households, 
over the pre and post-treatment horizons, contributing to at least one pension fund 
and exactly to one pension fund, and the average amounts contributed by those 
households possessing just one complementary pension plan. It seems evident that, 
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although an increase in average contribution seems to have occurred, no clear cut 
change shows up in 2002, with respect to 2000.  
Table 3 reports the results of pairwise comparison between mean average 
contributions of “first time” contributors, where by “first time” we mean people who 
did not contribute anything at t-2, while positively contributing at period t. We 
cannot be sure, of course, that those agents did not contribute anything in periods 
before t-2, and in period t-1 (as the survey is conducted every two years). 
 
Insert table 3 here 
 
From a cursory inspection of table 3 we understand that the only significant 
difference is that between years 2000 and 2004, and not much because of an increase 
in 2004, but rather for a somehow lower average contribution in 2000. 
 
 
4. A difference-in-difference analysis 
 
A preliminary, and crucial step in performing a difference-in-differences analysis is 
the choice of a suitable treatment and a control group.  
As we already mentioned, it should be the case that members of the control group are 
not influenced by the experiment (in our case, the increase in tax deductibility of 
pension savings, in 2001); this is so because we intend to evaluate the statistical 
significance of the difference:   
 
)()( cbcatbta PPPP                                                                                              (1) 
 
where taP  and tbP are payments for pension funds by members of the treatment 
group after and before treatment, and caP  and cbP  are payments by members of the 
control group after and before treatment. If the increase in payments by the treatment 
group statistically exceeds that of the control group, all else equal, we will conclude 
that the treatment has been effective.  
To identify the treatment and control group we might start from a very simplified and 
abstract representation of the decision problem of a household living for two periods, 
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having to allocate income or wealth in the first period over consumption and savings 
for retirement. 
This simple optimization problem can be cast as: 
 
)1(
),(max
22
1111
11
21
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ccUs
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
 
  
where 1w  and 2w  are the first and second period endowments, r is the period interest 
rate, L is the deductibility limit for pension savings (therefore, 1s  is the share of 
savings exceeding the limit), and )1( captures the fiscal benefit of this 
deductibility opportunity (in practice, devoting one unit of income to pension savings 
reduces consumption in the first period by  , which is less than one). 
The household’s choice can be represented graphically as in figure 1, illustrating a 
simple comparative static exercise, corresponding to a change in the limit from 1L  to 
2L  (with 12 LL  ), as in year 2000, where that limit was raised from about 1291 
euros to 5165 euros (and from 2% to 12% of gross income). The presence of L in the 
budget constraint generates a kink in the budget line, corresponding to Lwc  11 . 
The higher the limit, the higher the kink in the budget line. 
It is quite evident from figure 1 that if a household buys less pension insurance than 
1L , as for example at point A on indifference curve 1I , then raising the limit to 2L  
should not bring about any change in its optimal choice, all else equal. On the other 
hand, if the household’s choice were represented by point B on the graph, 
corresponding to a purchase of insurance larger than 1L , the change in policy will tilt 
the budget line upwards, and allow the household to move up to a possibly higher 
indifference curve, 3I , to a new optimal point C. Supposing that (aggregate) 
consumption is a normal good, this will correspond to less consumption at period 1, 
and more pension savings.  
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This simple exercise helps us select an appropriate treatment and control group for 
our empirical exercise. In particular, we will define a control group as that made up 
of those households spending less than 1291 euros on pension funds at year 2000 and 
less than 2% of gross income, and a treatment group as one made up of households 
spending more than that threshold, or being constrained by the 2% percent of income 
limit at year 2000. Although the response variable, the object of our analysis, is also 
used to affect agents to either group, we take care of the endogeneity issue by using 
expenditure on pension funds at t-2, in order to assign a given family to the control or 
to the treatment group. Even supposing that people who have spent more on pension 
funds in 2000 will be more inclined to spending in 2002, our empirical results will be 
unambiguous (i.e. they will hold a fortiori, if we are ready to assume a positive 
contemporaneous relationship between the classification variable and the dependent 
variable), as will be explained in the sequel. 
However, in order for the methodology to properly work, we should make the two 
groups as homogeneous as possible; in other words, the “coeteris paribus” 
assumption must hold. For that to be the case, we have to take care of the following 
issues: 1) differences in the composition of the two groups, in terms of socio-
demographic and economic variables; 2) aggregate macroeconomic shocks, which 
1c  
2c  
11 Lw   21 Lw   0 1w  
 
2w
 
w  
A 
C  
B 
1I  
2I  
3I  
2)1)(1(
~ Lrw  
 
1)1)(1(
~ Lrw  
 
Figure 1. Effect of tax incentives on savings. 
)1(~ 12 rwww   
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might have had an impact on the overall level of spending on pension funds, as well 
as on other forms of savings; 3) features which are specific to members of the 
treatment as opposed to members of the control groups (i.e. a higher propensity to 
save, etc…). 
The first issue will be dealt with by including appropriate control variables in the 
regression models, the second by including time specific dummies (or a “post”  
dummy variable, ,
post
i tD , taking value one if the observation relates to the period after 
the measure has been introduced), while the third problem will be taken care of by 
inserting dummies specific to the treatment and the control groups ( ,
tr
i tD , taking value 
one if the observation belongs  to the treatment group, zero otherwise). Key to the 
analysis will also be the “interacted” dummy variable , ,
tr post
i t i tD D , which takes value 
one if the corresponding observation relates to the treatment group and to the post 
treatment period, and zero otherwise. 
Therefore, the “difference in differences” model can be estimated by regressing the 
following equation: 
 
, , , , , , ,'
tr post tr post
i t i t i t i t i t i t i ty a D D D D X                                                        (2) 
                               
where the dependent variable is the amount paid for complementary pension funds 
by family i at time t, where  t = ante for all time periods up to year 2000, and t = post 
for later time periods; tiX , is a vector of controls, which we believe might play a role 
in determining the amounts of insurance bought (in particular, gender, income, 
wealth, number of dependent workers, number of income earners, years of education, 
and geographic area). Coefficient   captures differences between the amounts paid 
by families belonging to the treatment and the control groups, while coefficient   
captures the effects of common shocks intervening between ex-ante and ex-post 
periods (recessions or booms, for example). As anticipated above, the most important 
coefficient in our regression, corresponding to the estimate of expression (1), is  , 
the coefficient of the composite dummy variable posttrDD , yielding the effect of 
treatment after controlling for all other aggregate and idiosyncratic variables. As for 
the descriptive analysis, all quantities (except for the nominal threshold) have been 
deflated by a suitable deflator; this is however not crucial in the present set-up, where 
only quantities at years 2000 and 2002 are taken into consideration. 
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The results of the OLS estimates of equation (2) are contained in table 4. It is 
important to stress that a “general to specific” methodology has been applied to all 
regressions, and only the most parsimonious version of the model has been reported 
in the subsequent tables. Moreover, the same regressions were run in log-levels 
instead of levels, to account for heteroskedasticity; those regressions yielded similar 
results, but did not solve the heteroskedasticity issue (results not reported, but 
available on request). As the inclusion of income as a distinct regressor did not solve 
the problem either, Huber-White heteroskedasticity corrections for the variance-
covariance matrix have been used (robust standard errors). 
 
Insert Table 4 
 
 
The coefficient  ’s estimate is statistically significant, meaning that any change in 
yearly payments has been influenced by an aggregate common factor, over time. The  
  coefficient is negative and also highly significant, suggesting the failure of the 
fiscal policy measure to boost pension fund savings. 
We need some caution in interpreting this result, which appears at first a bit puzzling. 
Two remarks are in order. First, most important, our (negative) result would hold 
also in the presence of a correlation between the response variable and the variable 
used to classify individuals (in terms of treatment or control group). In fact, if such a 
problem were present in our dataset, it would positively bias the coefficient  . Our 
result can therefore be looked at as an upper bound of the actual effect of the reform. 
The negative sign might be possibly explained by looking at the composition of the 
control group, mainly formed by people with zero (retirement fund) investments in 
2000, and with positive expenditure in 2002. Our estimated coefficient   says that, 
on average, and conditional on the explanatory variables included in the regression, 
investments in retirement funds by people who were constrained by the previous 
fiscal regulations were substantially lower than those of people passing within two 
years from zero to a positive expenditure on pension funds.  
From table 4 we also realize that some other factors played a role in determining the 
amount of insurance bought. In particular, we notice that income has a positive 
effect, whereas the dummy corresponding to the number of income earners has a 
negative and statistically significant coefficient. Wealth, as well as other variables 
(home ownership, status of dependent worker, number of family components) did not 
turn out to play a (statistically) significant role, and were dropped, by implementing a 
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general to specific methodology. In other words, our regression results report only 
coefficients’ estimates for variables whose effect turned out to be statistically 
significant. 
To check whether our results crucially depend on the composition of the sample 
(many zeros in the control group) we repeated the same analysis on the more 
restricted sample containing only people who have positively contributed both in 
2000 and in 2002. 
Despite the necessarily smaller size of the sample the results, reported in table 5, are 
in line with those previously discussed. Once again, agents who were constrained in 
2000 have contributed less than the others, one year after the new regulation came in 
place. 
 
Insert table 5 here 
 
Our results cannot constitute compelling evidence, given the nature of the sample. 
We cannot, in fact, check whether immediately after the introduction of the new 
regulation there has been an increase in retirement fund contribution, as the sample 
does not contain data for 2001.  However, it seems clear that the policy measure did 
not have a (moderately) lasting impact on such investment, if it did have such an 
impact at all. 
It would be tempting to run a difference-in-differences logit or tobit analysis, to 
understand whether and up to what extent the new fiscal measures boosted fresh 
participation in the market. To do that, however, we would need identifying the 
treatment and control group in a substantially different way from the one we used, (in 
fact, both the treatment and control group should contain some individuals with zero 
expenditure on pension funds at year 2000, which is not true in our case for the 
treatment group); however, we do believe that even a simple logit regression may 
provide some additional evidence as to effectiveness of the policy measure. 
Table 6 contains the results of two separate logit regressions run on the 2000 and 
2002 sample. 
 
Insert table 6 
 
Using the estimated coefficients we ran a simple experiment, consisting in assessing 
the probability of contributing to pension funds for, respectively, an average (with 
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respect to the continuous variables) individual, in four possible scenarios, defined by 
the job status (a=dependent or b=autonomous worker) and area of residence (1= 
north or 2= south). As is clear from a rapid inspection of table 7, in three cases out of 
four there has been a decrease in the probability of contributing to a complementary 
form of retirement saving, if anything. Even in the case where an increase has been 
recorded (dependent worker in the south), this is very modest. 
 
Insert table 7 here 
 
5. Final remarks 
 
This paper has empirically analyzed the response of Italian households to an 
important fiscal policy change introduced in 2000 to boost investments in 
complementary pension plans. Using a simple difference-in-differences methodology 
we suggested that, contrary to our earlier expectations, a sizeable increase in the tax 
deductibility of retirement funds contributions did not lead to a substantial increase 
in such investments. We also suggested that such a measure did not augment the 
average contribution of new contributors. Some threshold effects might therefore 
called for to rationalize these results. 
These findings are at odds with some of the previous literature contributions on this 
topic, which dealt with other countries’ frameworks, both in Europe and elsewhere. 
They are not in contrast, however, with some recent results concerning the Italian 
market, which still lags behind most other countries in Europe, in term of size of the 
market and number of participants.  
As enphasized in the introduction, we believe our results may be interesting under 
some respects. First, because they concern a relatively young and less developed 
market for complementary pension products, for which relatively little empirical 
evidence has been produced. Second, in view of the extent of the policy change and, 
third, because of the data set used to carry out the analysis. However, we are also 
convinced that new evidence, possibly based on even more detailed datasets, would 
be extremely welcome to get new and more robust evidence on this issue. 
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TABLE 1     
 
Demographic, social and economic features of households (whole sample) in the pre and post reform period (mean values). 
(monetary values are expressed as yearly euros at constant prices of year 2000) 
 1995 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 
             
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 AF CPH AF CPH AF CPH AF CPH AF CPH AF CPH 
Age 54 48 54 48 54 48 57 48 57 48 57 48 
N. components. 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
N. earners 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Education 8 10 8 11 8 11 9 11 9 12 9 12 
% north 44.3 71.2 44.2 61.4 44.2 64.2 45.9 65.4 45.4 56.2 47.8 66.2 
% center 20.4 19.0 20.3 27.2 20.3 26.3 20.8 27.2 21.7 30.5 20.3 20.1 
% south & isles 35.5 9.7 35.5 11.4 35.5 9.5 33.3 7.4 32.9 13.3 31.9 13.7 
% life insurance 22.0 25.3 21.0 28.4 21.0 37.4 17.0 29.1 12.5 23.0 13.7 31.4 
% loss insurance 28.0 52.2 20.0 44.2 20.0 39.4 16.2 37.8 20.2 37.6 20 42.0 
% health insurance 11.0 24.4 8.9 22.6 8.9 24.1 6.6 17.0 6.3 19.2 5.5 16.2 
Net wealth 161740 255921 164605 240132 172457 236907 169070 252471 189389 289521 214688 288476 
% homeowners 63.9 72.4 67.2 72.8 69.1 75.4 69.2 78.3 69.7 74.5 70.0 75.2 
Annual net income 25864 37788 27099 37084 27179 37073 26264 38874 26454 38987 27147 37707 
Consumption 19733 26811 19340 26182 19603 25947 19009 27115 19832 27586 20129 26770 
Savings 6131 10977 7759 10902 7577 11578 7685 11709 6622 11401 7072 10936 
             
Note: This table illustrates the main features, along the demographic, social and economic dimension, of all families (AF) and complementary pension 
holding (CPH) families 
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TABLE 2     
 
Mean percentages of complementary pension funds holding before (panel A) and after (panel B) the 2000 reform, and mean annual contribution, for 
households holding just one such fund.  
(monetary values are expressed as yearly euros at constant prices of year 2000) 
 
(A) 1995 1998 2000 
    
    
% households with complementary pensions 7.4 8.2 11.4 
% households with ONE complementary pension 5.3 6.2 7.5 
Amount of contribution of households in the second group 1273.47 1152.42 1157.82 
    
(B) 2002 2004 2006 
    
% households with complementary pensions 8.0 8.5 7.9 
% households with ONE complementary pension 5.8 6.4 5.8 
Amount of contribution of households in the second group 1185.79 1443.52 1306.45 
    
 21 
 
TABLE 3 
 
Test of differences between  average “first” contributions.  
(P-values with pooled variances in brackets) 
 
 1998 2000 2002 2004 
     
1998 - 0.342 
(0.356) 
0.749 
(0.758) 
0.185 
(0.258) 
2000 0.342 
(0.356) 
- 0.620 
(0.600) 
0.031 
(0.022) 
2002 0.749 
(0.758) 
0.620 
(0.600) 
- 0.129 
(0.149) 
2004 0.185 
(0.258) 
0.031 
(0.022) 
0.129 
(0.149) 
- 
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TABLE 4 
 
Effects of the fiscal  incentives of the 2000 reform on complementary pension  savings 
 
Variable Estimate Robust Standard Error T-Statistic Probability value 
     
trD  1726.60 226.77 7.61 0.000 
posttrDD  -1908.20 262.24 -7.28 0.000 
postD  972.44 124.83 7.79 0.000 
No. of income earners -120.65 63.47 -1.90 0.058 
Income .01 .004 2.89 0.004 
     
Sample size 488    
2R  0.61    
     
Note: the dependent variable is the contribution to complementary pension funds.  is a dummy variable that is equal to 0 for 
individuals belonging to the treatment group and is equal to 1 otherwise, i.e. for individuals belonging to the control group.  is 
a dummy variable which is equal to 0 before the fiscal reform, i.e. in year 2000, and is equal to 1 after the fiscal reform, i.e. in year 
2002.  
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TABLE 5 
 
Effects of the fiscal  incentives of the 2000 reform on complementary pension savings 
(sample restricted to individuals with positive savings in year 2000) 
 
Variable Estimate Robust Standard Error T-Statistic Probability value 
     
traD  1425.42 215.96 6.60 0.000 
posttrDD  -1293.24 263.18 -4.91 0.000 
postD  346.28 166.91 2.07 0.039 
Income .01 .003 4.47 0.000 
     
Sample size 236    
2R  0.63    
     
Note: the dependent variable is the contribution to complementary pension funds.  is a dummy variable that is equal to 0 for 
individuals belonging to the treatment group and is equal to 1 otherwise, i.e. for individuals belonging to the control group.  is 
a dummy variable which is equal to 0 before the fiscal reform, i.e. in year 2000, and is equal to 1 after the fiscal reform, i.e. in year 
2002.  
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TABLE 6      
 
Logit Analysis - Contributing to a complementary retirement plan 
 
YEAR 2000 
Variable Estimate Standard Error T-Statistic Probability value 
     
Dependent worker .1417044 .110664 1.28 0.200 
Autonomous worker .3279414 .1251776 2.62 0.009 
North .520865 .093532 5.57 0.000 
South -1.426975 .1650293 -8.65 0.000 
No. of income earners .270842 .0524089 5.17 0.000 
Real Assets .0260251 .015753 1.65 0.099 
Financial Assets .1845512 .0210681 8.76 0.000 
Age .0765421 .0216139 3.54 0.000 
Squared Age -.0011768 .0002206 -5.33 0.000 
Income .4107208 .0940333 4.37 0.000 
Constant -9.405405 .9136088 -10.29 0.000 
Sample size 7958    
Pseudo
2R  0.22    
     
YEAR 2002 
Variable Estimate Standard Error T-Statistic Probability value 
     
Dependent worker .5333665 .1324588 4.03 0.000 
Autonomous worker .4567655 .1477595 3.09 0.002 
North .0474776 .0990474 0.48 0.632 
South -1.784864 .1928181 -9.26 0.000 
No. of income earners .043372 .0620885 0.70 0.485 
Real Assets .0643519 .0209883 3.07 0.002 
Financial Assets .1490079 .0269811 5.52 0.000 
Age .1235908 .0279822 4.42 0.000 
Squared Age -.0015807 .000287 -5.51 0.000 
Income .5455361 .1055487 5.17 0.000 
Constant -12.06573 1.051003 -11.48 0.000 
Sample size 7990    
Pseudo 
2R  0.20    
     
Note: the dependent variable is a dummy variable which is equal to 1 if the individual contributes to a complementary retirement 
plan and is equal to 0 otherwise.
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TABLE 7 
     
Probabilities of contributing to supplemental retirement funds, before and after the reform 
 
 North South 
   
Dependent 0.572319 
(0.579509) 
 
0.160229 
(0.1807042) 
 
Autonomous 0.61717 
(0.5607378) 
 
0.045499 
(0.024656) 
 
   
Note: probabilities are computed by the logistic model of table 6, at the mean value of  all continuous variables (number of income 
earners, real assets, financial assets, income, age and age squared. Numbers out of the parentheses refer to probabilities computed at 
year 2000, i.e. before the fiscal reform, while the numbers in parentheses refer to probabilities computed at year 2002, i.e. after the 
fiscal reform. 
 
